![]() ![]() ![]() A forced-choice signal-detection paradigm showed that the effect of self-resemblance operated at an unconscious level, since the same participants were unable to detect the presence of their own faces in the above morphs. 33%) of another face, the 22% was chosen consistently as the preferred morph and, in particular, when Self was blended in the partner’s face. When ranking morphs differing in level of amalgamation (i.e., 11% vs. The Self-based morph was also preferred to the morph of their partner’s face blended with the partner’s same-sex “prototype”, although the latter face was (“objectively”) judged more attractive by other individuals. Participants distinctly preferred a “Self-based morph” (i.e., their partner’s face with a small amount of Self’s face blended into it) to other morphed images. Participants chose the most attractive face image of their romantic partner among several variants, where the faces were morphed so as to include only 22% of another face. In the present study, we assessed the role of resemblance to Self’s facial traits in judgments of physical attractiveness. Thus, mate choice may be a balancing of phenotypic similarity and dissimilarity between partners. Some of the criticism and conclusions of this article are about our general transfer pricing regime, while the analysis is limited to the valuation of intangibles' aspects, yet, since this is probably the area that presents the most acute challenge to the current regime, so building upon it may be an important step towards reform.Opposing forces influence assortative mating so that one seeks a similar mate while at the same time avoiding inbreeding with close relatives. The article's contribution in this regard is the argument that it is not only practically more desirable and less costly, but that it is also more coherent and natural to our general international tax regime therefore, in terms of design, transfer pricing reform should take into account the basic premises of such regime. The article demonstrates that the undesirable reliance of our transfer pricing regime on the arms' length principle is the primary reason for the grim picture portrayed, and therefore advocates its replacement with a formula-based regime. The article particularly criticizes the regime's disregard of the unique characteristics of intangibles that make them difficult to valuate its disregard of the differences between types of intangibles and its extraordinary narrow and limited approach to valuation. These incentives create a strong bias in favor of large multinational enterprises, yet, even if one favored such bias, it is achieved using an uncontrollable, costly and wasteful legal mechanism. A detailed analysis of the practice of valuation of intangibles, which is the key component in the application of this regime, exposes its weaknesses that result in undesirable market incentives. ![]() This article assesses the desirability of our current, arms' length based, transfer pricing regime by analyzing its theoretical and practical effectiveness in application to transfers of intangibles.
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